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Abstract
Purpose. Information disclosure is driven by multiple determinants, most of them 
supported by traditional theories, such as agency theory, contingency theory, and 
legitimacy theory. This research aims to identify a set of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPI), disclosed to stakeholders through Internet. It also aims to apply for an integrated 
performance scoreboard, acting as a dynamic comparative tool, in particular for listed 
companies whose market value is driven by investor expectations and needs.
Design/methodology/approach. Based on 47 listed companies from the Portuguese 
Stock Index regulated market, and through an interpretive content analysis, research 
was driven towards the identification of KPI that were explicitly reported to stakeholders 
through structured or unstructured frameworks. This qualitative approach supports the 
evidence on performance indicators reported by listed companies to stakeholders, in 
particular to potential stockholders.
Findings. Companies disclose a wide variety of key performance indicators, however 
in most cases included in their periodical management reports. Only some companies 
disclose those indicators through a visible form in their websites. Furthermore, the 
disclosed KPI have a generic nature and are usually complemented by theoretical 
explanations about their evolution and trends. The diversity of indicators disclosed does 
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not permit a comparison between companies and activity sectors. Key performance 
indicators are still disclosed on a voluntarily basis, remaining, within this scope, multiple 
agency conflicts and other issues around agency costs. Considering the intensity and 
categorisation of in information disclosure, a standard framework is required in order 
to ensure a dynamic comparison between companies or sectors.   
Research limitations. The scope of this research is the regulated market of Portugal. 
Further research can include sample companies listed in other European regulated 
markets or even non-listed companies. The selection of indicators for the proposed 
framework was based exclusively on frequencies and not on the value and importance 
attributed to them by stakeholders. Thus, a survey is required in order to certify that 
the selected indicators are the ones that best fit stakeholder expectations and needs. 
Furthermore, the research was based on website content and management report 
analysis that determines a certain level of subjectivity, natural source of interpretation 
biases. 
Practical implications. Empirical evidence is the basis for a structured KPI 
scoreboard proposal in order to ensure a periodical comparison between companies, 
from the perspective of external stakeholders.
Originality/value. This paper grants and promotes an integrated overview 
about the key performance indicators expressly disclosed to stakeholders through 
Internet by Portuguese listed companies. This evidence has used scoreboard proposal 
as a basis for towards a comparative analysis in the traditional balanced scorecard 
perspectives. This scoreboard can be disclosed to the market by companies as a basis for 
an overall performance evaluation and business comprehensiveness. However, further 
developments are required, in particular in the domain of policy making. Information 
disclosed to the market is not regulated enough in order to minimise the performance 
analysis discretion and overall transparency.  
Keywords: corporate reporting, information disclosure, internet, performance, 
scoreboard.
Paper type: Research paper
1. Introduction
Electronic platforms, in particular the Internet, have emerged as a more direct 
and faster way to reach stakeholders. The range of information disclosed through 
Internet has been gradually enlarged, in particular electronic financial reporting for 
companies integrated in stock exchange regulated markets. Business developments and 
stakeholder expectations and needs have demanded that companies reduce their agency 
costs and, therefore, intensify their information disclosure. Those information flows 
are sometimes supported by legal standards and statements, in particular accounting 
standards, requiring the introduction of some filters and control agents in the systems 
that ensure accuracy and reliability of the information effectively disseminated. 
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Considering that the Internet has become a favoured medium, technological advances 
have led the new era changes in the means available to corporations, government 
agencies, and the potential investors to obtain and disseminate information.
Notwithstanding various benefits associated with information disclosure through 
corporate websites, multiple determinants exist that affect the dissemination intensity 
flow. Information asymmetry remains one of the main topics, requiring the set of rules 
and procedures to ensure the quality of information to be disclosed. Furthermore, 
some costs are associated with collection, presentation and dissemination of 
information which induces companies to involve in an ongoing management 
process of information disclosure. The Internet has revolutionised several traditional 
approaches towards the way that companies do their businesses and manage their 
information flows (Tapscott et al., 2000). Thus, as business reporting on the Internet 
becomes more widespread, most market agents and regulators tend to question the 
acceptability and quality of internet-based business reporting (Khadaroo, 2005). In 
fact, there are no rules or standards in the scope of performance indicators to be 
disclosed to the market in a structured framework. Thus, discretionary analysis can be 
made or perceived by different groups of stakeholders, depending on their knowledge, 
expectations and beliefs.  
This paper intends to identify the main key performance indicators (KPI) 
disclosed, in an explicit form, by Portuguese listed companies through internet or 
even other electronic platforms and devices. After being categorised according to the 
balanced scorecard approach (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), this research also aims to 
propose a KPI scoreboard, applicable to listed companies. This study also considers 
the implications of that scoreboard in the future stakeholder perceptiveness. Thus, the 
paper is structured as follows. A review of relevant literature is provided, by exploring 
the topic around information disclosure, including its drivers and determinants. The 
proposed methodology is discussed in Section 3. Empirical evidence is presented and 
commented in Section 4, followed by a section on lessons learned and directions.           
2. Information Disclosure
2.1. Drivers and detractors
Companies, in particular listed companies, are requested to disseminate 
information to stakeholders towards integrated business performance overview and 
activity comprehensiveness. The Internet has emerged as key electronic performance 
in the information disclosure process (Asbaugh et al., 1999; Gowthorpe, 2004; 
Khadaroo, 2005; Hunter and Smith, 2009; Aly et al., 2010; Oyelere and Karuppu, 2012; 
Uyar, 2012; Basuony and Mohamed, 2014), putting organisations and stakeholders 
in an immediate networked environment. Electronic businesses models (Tapscott 
et al., 2000), and information and communication technologies have introduced 
several changes in the society in individuals’ behaviour and in organisational rules 
and procedures (Khadaroo, 2005). Furthermore, stakeholders also expect for 
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organisational key performance indicators that enable them to support individual and 
collective decisions and actions.
  In general terms, information disclosure to stakeholders is strongly influenced 
by several theories, including agency theory principles. Broadly speaking, this 
theory has been incorporated in multiple scientific fields, particularly in accounting 
(Demski, 1980), economics (Spence and Zeckhouser, 1971), marketing (Basu et al., 
1985), political science (Mitnick, 1986), finance (Fama, 1980; Fontrodona and Sison, 
2006), behaviour and organisational culture (Eisenhardt, 1985; Kosnik, 1987; Kulik, 
2005) and sociology (White, 1985; Shapiro, 2005). However, the controversy over its 
usefulness, applicability and validity remains relevant even today. It was developed 
during 1960s and the early 1970s by several economists, including Arrow (1971) and 
Wilson (1968). It translates the problem of attitude to risk either by individuals and/
or groups (Ross, 1973). The differentiation of objectives inherent to those parties that 
leads their attitude is also different. Those are relations between the principal and the 
agent, metaphorically supported by a contract-oriented behaviour of parties who take 
different attitudes towards risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
According to Eisenhardt (1989), an agency relationship arises between two or 
more parties in a designated agent, acting for the other, called the main field in a 
particular decision. Both parties acting in favour of their own interest, the principal 
conducts its action to minimise the costs and the agent acts in order to minimise their 
action. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency costs correspond to the sum 
of the monitoring costs by the principal (associated with the incentives of the agent 
and the monitoring process of their activity), expenses of the undertaking by the agent 
(associated with the resources spent by the agent to compensate the principal for 
inappropriate actions) and residual losses (associated with the degree of divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and the decisions that potentially maximise the well-
being of the principal).
The paradigm of the usefulness of information for decision-making is now one 
of the key issues in the designing process towards information dissemination to 
their stakeholders. The profound changes that have occurred in the economies in 
general and in business models in particular, require information to be disclosed 
in a timely manner and meeting the expectations of its users. In this asymmetrical 
dialogue (Gowthorpe, 2004), many factors determine the type, timing and intensity 
with which that information is disseminated. Electronic platforms have assumed 
critical importance in this dissemination process and have changed the boundaries 
of businesses (Tapscott et al., 2000), including legal requirements and standards 
(Asbaugh et al., 1999; Hunter and Smith, 2009; Aly et al., 2010; Uyar, 2012; Basuony 
and Mohamed, 2014). 
Several theories have explained various factors that influence information 
disclosure drivers. However, it is our understanding that the factors determining the 
dissemination of information result from a symbiosis between the business complexity 
and stakeholder needs. Thus, each of those theories find their basis in the social contract 
established between the company and its stakeholders, creating internal mechanisms 
to respond to changes occurring in the environment. Listed companies influenced 
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by participants in the market tend to reduce agency costs by disclosing large flow of 
corporate information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Basuony and Mohamed, 2014).
The contingency theory assumes a theoretical perspective that contingencies 
such as size, uncertainty and risk, technology and environmental pressures affect 
an organisation’s development and operating processes. Thus, organisations cannot 
develop a standard framework to plan, organise and control their own activities. At the 
same time, institutional theory considers that organisations should adapt to external 
expectations, so there are external pressures to implement appropriate practices to 
disseminate information. The fact that organisations tend to implement the same 
structures and practices over time in response to social requirements is designated in 
the literature as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). The theory 
of legitimacy is based on the notion of the social contract between the reporting 
entity and the society in which it operates (Guthrie et al., 2004). The dissemination of 
information is one way to relieve social pressure and legitimate their organisational 
activities.
The usefulness issue of information management has a diffuse scope based on 
multiple drivers: the type of information user, their information needs, the emerging 
pressure from capital markets, the changes occurred in the environment in which 
organisations develop their activities and even regulatory requirements often resulting 
from political decisions. Indeed, we cannot link a particular theory to the behaviours of 
entities and stakeholders regarding the dissemination of information. Those theories 
have specific determinants that embody individual and collective behaviours. These 
behaviours derive from the symbiosis assumptions inherent in each particular theory.
Several factors exist that explain the intensity in the information process, in 
particular through electronic platforms (Asbaugh et al., 1999; Gowthorpe, 2004; Aly 
et al., 2010; Uyar, 2012; Oyelere and Karuppu, 2012; Basuony and Mohamed, 2014). 
Thus, evidence shows that information disclosures are significantly associated with 
company size, which means that large companies provide more mandatory and even 
voluntary disclosures than SMEs (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Mutawaa and Hewaidi, 2010; Dragu and Tudor, 2011; Arvidsson, 2011). Related key 
profitability indicators, such as ROE or ROA, are not convergent evidence (Wallace 
et al., 1994; Street and Gray, 2002; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Broberg et al., 2010; 
Dragu and Tudor, 2011), which means that other variables exist that drive effective 
information compliance and disclosure. Despite such evidence, the use of internet in 
corporate reporting is still driven by multiple determinants that are explored in the 
next section.
2.2. Determinants of corporate reporting on the internet
In the last decades, computer technology has drastically changed the flow of 
information between organisations that provide and consumers who demand financial 
data. This platform has created a new mechanism by which individuals and groups can 
provide a wide range of heterogeneous information to decision makers (Ashbaugh et 
al., 1999). Indeed, the possibilities offered by the internet for more genuine, timely 
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and symmetrical dialogue between organisations and stakeholders have been flagged 
many times, even today, when dialogue remains limited and asymmetrical and the 
disseminators of information manage the flow of information (Gowthorpe, 2004), 
in particular voluntary internet financial reporting practices (Oyelere and Kuruppu, 
2012). According to agency theory, principal leads the flow of information disclosed 
through internet, selecting and manipulating access, in particular to mandatory 
information. Thus, website efficiency also depends on the facilities available to access 
and download useful information for each stakeholder’s category. As evidenced by 
Oyelere and Kuruppu (2012), the majority of companies maintain corporate websites 
to disseminate diversified information, primarily information about the company, 
and the products and services they offer. Thus, internet is seen as the opportunity 
to promote themselves and their products and services, with disclosure of financial 
information being secondary. In fact, fewer companies with active websites use them 
as a medium for communicating financial information.
The disclosure of information flow through electronic platforms can be influenced 
by several determinants, such as size, activity sector, profitability indicators, and 
leverage ratios, among others. The Steering Committee of the Business Reporting 
Research Project has enumerated a set of potential determinants, acting as enablers 
or detractors in the process of disclosing financial information through the internet. 
According to FASB (2000), six key motives can drive the level of financial information 
disclosure: (1) reducing the cost and time to distribute information; (2) communicating 
with previously unidentified consumers of information; (3) supplementing traditional 
disclosure practices; (4) increasing the amount and type of data disclosed; (5) 
improving access to potential investors form small companies; and (6) up-to-date 
information through regular maintenance of websites. However, other practical issues 
should be considered, such as reliability and selective reporting (Uyar, 2012).  
Basuony and Mohamed (2014) and Aly et al. (2010) have found that large 
companies tend to disclose more financial information in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and also reduce agent costs. Being subjected to more exposure, the firms 
come under higher pressure, such as listed companies. This evidence is consistent with 
agency theory stating that large firms attempt to reduce high agency costs associated 
with information asymmetry between market participants, by disclosing a large flow of 
corporate information. Furthermore, companies tend to disclose more information as 
an attractiveness mechanism by reducing the expected cost of capital (Aly et al., 2010). 
However, there is no linkage between this type of information and key performance 
indicators explicitly disclosed.
Broadly speaking, listed companies are required to disclose financial information 
as stated in regulated stock market regulations. Those companies are obliged to publicly 
communicate financial information and produce quarterly management reports, 
make announcements to investors, disclose important events by press releases, and 
inform stakeholders about social and environmental responsibility activities through 
their corporate websites. As evidenced by Uyar (2012), companies utilise the internet 
actively as a communication tool for investor relations by disclosing financial and 
non-financial information. However, some items are not disclosed as much as others 
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that require additional developments to increase the transparency of the companies. 
Key performance indicators are included in the management reports through non-
structured frameworks, inducing stakeholders to undertake a dynamic discretionary 
analysis on company integrated performance.
The use of internet has effectively changed the way and the timeliness to reach 
stakeholders (information on topics, such as corporate overview; stockholder 
information; and financial information). Markets that suffer from low liquidity, firms 
that invest in internet technology are able to use the electronic medium to attract 
investors from abroad, analysts, and creditors who might have otherwise consider 
the emerging market securities within their portfolios (Hunter and Smith, 2009). 
As mentioned by Tapscott et al. (2000), network economics drive the interlinked 
phenomena of increasing returns and network effects. Information as the raw material 
in the decision-making process experiences a new intensity flow and rules, in many 
cases reaching stakeholders even in an unstructured way and without being subjected 
to any filter for accuracy and reliability.
3. Methodology
This research analyses the extent to which and whether information on 
performance indicators is disclosed to stakeholders through the internet. It is based 
on 47 non-finance companies, all of them listed in the Euronext Lisbon regulated 
market, with reference to 31 December 2013. Companies were aggregated according 
to seven activity sectors: media and advertising (6.4%); petrol and energy (12.8%); 
consumer materials (6.4%); technologies and communications (14.9%); construction 
and infrastructures (14.9%); equipment and industry (21.3%); consumer services and 
transportation (23.4%), as illustrated in the graph below.
Through content analysis (Abraham and Cox, 2007), company websites were 
explored in the first step in order to find explicit management control indicators 
(visible data) disclosed to stakeholders. In the second step, the content of annual 
management reports (invisible data) was explored to identify KPI that were effectively 
disseminated in a specific performance section analysis, independently of their 
structured or unstructured framework. Social and environment reports were excluded 
from this analysis. The data collected was based on visible and invisible data by using 
the most common web browsers, such as the Internet Explorer or Google Chrome. 
For invisible data, we have analysed the annual reports (performance analysis section) 
for the economic year of 2013. However, in 17 cases (27.7%), the annual reports of 
this year have not been disclosed yet. Thus, in this case the last annual report available 
was used (2012). Explicit performance indicators were registered and counted for 
frequency purposes. The content analysis was carried out during May 2014.
In the third step, KPI were associated with the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) perspective 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996), namely financial perspective, market perspective, internal 
processes perspective, and learning and growth perspective. This stage was based on 
an interpretive approach (Ryan et al., 2002; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013), by linking 
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the theoretical framework of BSC with performance indicators disseminated by 
companies. Thus, a theory is used to provide insights in organisational actions, despite 
the intrinsic subjective interpretation and agreement in the categorisation linkage.      
4. Evidences and Discussion
Performance analysis is traditionally based on a set of key performance indicators 
disseminated to stakeholders in a direct/indirect way by using several structured/ 
unstructured frameworks. In this research we have found that only 7 companies 
(14.9%) directly disclose a set of KPI in their websites. Other companies include those 
indicators in a dispersed way and in their periodical management reports, but in an 
identified section for the purposes of performance analysis. As required by regulated 
market rules, information for investors should be disseminated through identified 
links, in compliance with the regulatory requirements. All websites were updated, 
namely the announcements made to regulated market as required by regulatory 
guidelines. 
Table 1. Main Financial KPI indicators
KPI Description Measure fi %
1 Net Revenue ‘000 €/$ 47 100
2 Return On Invested Capital Ratio 3 6,4
3 ROE Ratio 32 68,1
4 ROA Ratio 29 61,7
5 Liquidity ratio Ratio 16 34,0
6 EBITDA ‘000 €/$ 47 100
7 Net Income ‘000 €/$ 47 100
8 CAPEX ‘000 €/$ 47 100
9 Net Debts Ratio 27 57,4
10 Gross Value Added % 6 12,8
11 Earnings per share Ratio 19 40,4
12 Operational Revenues ‘000 €/$ 13 27,7
13 Contribution Margin % 9 19,1
14 Volume of Exportations % 6 12,8
15 Employee Costs ‘000 €/$ 25 53,2
                       Source: Corporate Annual Reports
Financial indicators are the most immediate and visible from the perspective of 
an actual or potential stockholder. Companies usually disclose return indicators, such 
as Earnings before Interests, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA), Net 
Income, Capital Expenditures (CAPEX), Return on Assets (ROA) and/or Return on 
Equity (ROE). Accounting-based measures, such as Net Revenue, Net Income, and 
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Net Debts, are also disclosed. However, in case those indicators act as a red flag (with 
negative signal), they are not explicitly disseminated. Petrol and energy observes 
major frequency in the dissemination of those indicators.  
Table 2. Main Market KPI indicators
KPI Description Measure fi %
1 Customer satisfaction index Index 9 19.1
2 Customers satisfaction index Index 19 40.4
3 Number of customers ∆ # 31 66.0
4 Brands recognition index Index 3 6.4
5 Market share % 19 40.4
6 Number of Distribution Channels ∆ % 9 19.1
7 Revenue by segment ‘000 €/$ 6 12.8
8 Quality score (certification standards) Score 16 34.0
9 Complaints resolution cycle (days) Days 11 23.4
10 Turnover by geographical market ‘000 €/$ 28 59.6
15 Commercial alliances # 10 21.3
          Source: Corporate Annual Reports
In the market perspective, companies tend to disseminate more aggregated 
indicators, such as satisfaction or quality indexes. Most of them relate to customer 
satisfaction and efficiency in the complaint procedures. Furthermore, and as observed 
in the set of indicators for other perspectives, they are compared in most cases with 
the marks achieved in the previous periods. This allows stakeholders’ a dynamic 
perspective on the indicator variations and trends.
Table 3. Main Internal Process KPI indicators
KPI Description Measure fi %
1 Environmental certifications # 25 53.2
2 Costs reductions % 16 34.0
3 Quality certifications # 44 93.6
4 Inventories rotation Days 17 36.2
5 Rejection rate % 4 8.5
6 Claims frequency # 6 12.8
7 Scraps and rejection rate % 3 6.4
8 Emergency calls Average 4 8.5
9 Machinery productivity Ratio 9 19.1
10 Accidents at work # 3 6.4
          Source: Companies’ Annual Reports
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Internal processes and learning and growth indicators in external reports assume 
residual nature. Companies do not disseminate information that can be critical from 
a strategic point of view. Thus, in this perspective, companies usually inform about 
quality certifications (93.6%), overall costs rationalisation (34%), and machinery 
productivity (19.1%). As mentioned by Kaplan and Norton (1996:93), “All companies 
are now attempting to improve quality, reduce cycle times, increase yields, maximize 
throughput, and lower costs for their business process”.   
Table 4. Main Learning and Growth KPI indicators
KPI Description Measure fi %
1 R&D as a percentage of sales % 12 25.5
2 Variation in the Internet visits per month ∆ # 14 29.8
3 Qualified employees (higher education training) % 27 57.5
4 Current IT useful lives Years 2 4.3
5 Employee satisfaction Index 3 6.4
6 Training expenditures as percentage of total revenue % 17 36.2
7 Full time employees % 29 61.7
8 Human capital return on investment Ratio 1 2.1
9 Severity of accidents at work Scale 3 6.4
10 Investments in ICT ‘000 €/$ 32 68.1
        Source: Corporate Annual Reports
The learning and growth perspective is probably the most sensitive field in terms of 
performance analysis. It relates to human resources and technologies and is associated 
to capabilities and subsequent productivity. This perspective stresses the importance 
of investing in other areas, such as information and communication technologies 
(ICT) and research and development (R&D). Thus, companies disseminate some 
key performance indicators, however characterised by their generic nature. The 
most disclosed KPI are: Investments in ICT (68.1%); Full-Time Employees (61.7%); 
Qualified Employees (57.5%); Variation in Internet Visits per Month (29.8%); and 
R&D as a percentage of sales (25.5%).
As evidenced in the tables above, multiple performance indicators are disclosed 
by listed companies in their periodical management reports. Those indicators are 
usually complemented with brief commentaries about their evolution and trends. The 
KPI disclosed are consistent with literature review, in particular in Parmenter (2007). 
However, the variety of indicators observed does not permit a comparison between 
companies neither between activity sectors. Thus, based on the most disseminated 
indicators by the companies under analysis, we propose the following twenty key 
performance indicators.  
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Table 5. Scoreboard framework
Financial Perspective Market Perspective
KPI FYN FY(N-1) KPI FYN FY(N-1)
Net Revenue Customer Satisfaction
EBITDA Number of Customers
Net Income Market Share
CAPEX Quality Score
ROE Segmented Turnover
Internal Process Perspective Learning and Growth Perspective
KPI FYN FY(N-1) KPI FYN FY(N-1)
Cost Reduction Investment in ICT
Certifications Full-Time Employees
Inventories Rotation Training Expenditure
Machinery Productivity Qualified Employees
Claims Frequency Internet Visits
The scoreboard proposed above intends to facilitate performance analysis by 
stakeholders, including the evolution and trends of KPIs. However, information 
about company performance is still disseminated on a voluntary basis, leading the 
companies and stakeholders to a systematic asymmetrical dialogue (Gowthrope, 
2004). As referred in FASB (2000), the internet has increased the amount and type 
of data disclosed and has enabled the communication process with previously 
unidentified consumers of information. In this perspective, we have perceived that in 
recent years companies have improved the quality of information disclosed, including 
its categorisation according to different classes of stakeholders. In the context of 
regulated markets, further developments are required, in particular in the domain of 
policy making. Information disclosed to the market is not sufficiently regulated in 
order to minimise the performance analysis discretion and overall transparency. Thus, 
agency conflicts still remain between companies and stockholders, influencing the gap 
between company market and accounting (equity) values.     
5. Lessons Learned and Directions
In this research we have presented an overall overview of the performance 
indicators disseminated through the internet to stakeholders, in particular to potential 
stockholders. Regulated markets require the disclosure of information through 
company websites, namely the financial information, press releases, and other 
announcements. However, information about KPI is still disclosed on a voluntary basis 
and in non-structured forms. From stakeholder perspective, this does not permit any 
comparison between companies or even activity sectors. Some companies disseminate 
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a set of indicators directly on their websites, while others integrate those indicators 
in their management reports. Based on the most disseminated indicators effectively 
disclosed, we have proposed a scoreboard framework for a four perspective analysis.
As other studies and approaches, this research has its intrinsic limitations. First, 
the sample used is limited to Portuguese listed companies on Euronext regulated 
market. Second, the selection of indicators was based exclusively on frequencies 
and not on the value and importance attributed by stakeholders to those indicators. 
This approach does not ensure that the selected indicators are the ones that best fit 
stakeholder expectations and needs. Third, this research was also based on websites 
and management report analysis which introduces a certain level of subjectivity, a 
natural source of interpretation bias.
This paper also intends to guide researchers for further directions, namely on the 
topic of information quality and transparency. Web-based reporting is moving ahead 
very quickly, requiring new policies and rules from value system agents, in particular 
business regulators, to minimise agency conflicts and agency costs. The main and 
fruitful research directions can be to surpass the intrinsic limitations of this paper.       
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